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Whistleblower law book and gavel in a court.The news in recent years has had many stories about “whistleblowers”—what they reported, what caused them to blow the whistle, and what happened as a result. Perhaps you have seen some sort of misconduct on the part of an employer, a corporation, a competitor, or a health provider. And you wonder “Am I a whistleblower?” or “What do I do?” Or perhaps you have already reported some wrongdoing and are wondering if you are now experiencing retaliation.

There are many kinds of whistles to blow, many incentives for blowing the whistle, and many protections for whistleblowers. The procedures and processes vary, depending upon which law offers the protection. This means that the wise thing to do if you are in this situation is to contact an experienced whistleblower attorney who can help you sort out what has happened and what to do.

Protection for Blowing the Whistle on Wrongful Conduct

A whistle can be blown when you are experiencing a personal employment situation that violates federal or state laws. For example, if you are experiencing discrimination at work because of your gender, race, or religious beliefs, you can report that discrimination. Federal and state laws generally prohibit retaliation for making the report. If retaliation occurs, there are actions you can take, including filing a lawsuit. A successful whistleblower claim of this type has the potential to deter employers from illegal conduct and, importantly, to make you whole, for example, by making up lost pay and compensating you for the emotional distress you have experienced.

Many federal and state laws prohibit retaliation for other types of whistleblowing, including reporting workplace safety violations, abuse of vulnerable adults, discriminatory conduct against other employees, illegal pay practices, and violation of other state and federal statutes. Federal and state employees often have special protections for reporting government wrongdoing, waste, fraud, and abuse. These anti-retaliation provisions provide similar “make-whole” relief to a whistleblower as described above.

Reward Programs for Blowing the Whistle

Federal and state legislatures have also enacted premiums on some types of whistleblowing to provide whistleblowers with money incentives to come forward and identify illegal conduct. These whistleblower reward programs typically involve reporting illegal conduct that cheats the government, taxpayers, or investors of money and in so doing also causes other harm. The rewards in these whistleblower programs are typically a percentage of money the government collects from the wrongdoers as a result of a report and may depend on the type and amount of assistance the whistleblower provides to the government. These awards can be substantial depending on the type of report that has been made. Finally, these reward programs generally have anti-retaliation provisions as well to protect employee whistleblowers.

Whistleblower reward programs include federal and state statutes (False Claims Act statutes) prohibiting fraud against the government in any area, including health care, defense procurement, small business programs and government grants. Significant tax fraud is covered by a separate IRS whistleblower statute. Rewards are also available to persons who report fraud that impacts investors in securities and those who participate in commodities futures. Corrupt foreign practices by corporations are also covered by a rewards statute (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) that covers, among other things, bribery involving foreign governments.

These statutes recognize that the government cannot monitor all of its activities to identify where illegal conduct or fraud has occurred, and that individuals who observe the illegal conduct are in a much better position to assist the government in challenging that wrongdoing. Billions of dollars have been collected as a result of whistleblower actions under statutes described above.

When You Reach a Turning Point

It is daunting to reach a turning point because you have experienced or observed conduct that you cannot ignore. This is when you need experienced whistleblower counsel to help you understand your options and chart your course. Knowing which statutes apply to your situation and how to invoke them is obviously important along with many other issues. For example, it is important to know that some whistleblower programs allow the whistleblower to remain anonymous, and some do not, but that there is always a risk that a whistleblower will be identified. It is also important to know that blowing the whistle can take a long time, but that patience will bring satisfaction that you have done what you can and need to do.

Whistleblower laws empower individuals to challenge wrongdoing. Unethical, unlawful, and unsafe practices tend to get worse the longer they are allowed to continue. More people can be hurt, more taxpayer money can be wasted, and those who follow the rules can lose to underhanded tactics. By stopping wrongdoing, whistleblowers send the message to individuals and organizations that there are repercussions of illegal conduct, and they will be held accountable. Whistleblowers who feel this urgency to act provide a tremendous service to their communities, their employers, taxpayers, and their government. Halunen Law values the courage of those who step forward and is committed to providing them with wise, compassionate, and results-oriented counsel.

SusanC-headshot-300×300A Partner at Halunen Law, Susan Coler is a member of the Halunen Law False Claims Act (FCA)/Whistleblower Practice Group. She represents whistleblowers nationwide who challenge illegal corporate conduct, particularly fraud against the government. She represented a relator in an FCA claim against Abbott Laboratories that resulted in a civil settlement of $800 million (total settlement of $1.5 billion), the fifth-largest civil healthcare recovery ever achieved under the FCA.

Three twenty dollar bills resting in a restaurant bill folder. In Minnesota, the answer is, “No, not if you don’t want to.” Your tips are your tips.

For decades, it has been the law in Minnesota that an employer cannot require an employee to pool (i.e., share) their tips with other employees or the employer (including management).[1] In fact, an employer cannot play any role in that decision.[2] An employer can’t refuse to hire someone or threaten to fire someone if they refuse to participate in the pool.

Employers can do a few things, including safeguarding and distributing the tips, as well as recording them for tax purposes. But whether you share your tips is your decision.

In a similar vein, restaurants and other service industries will often add a “service charge” to a bill. Unless it is made clear to the customer that this charge is not a tip, that service charge belongs to the employee providing the service.[3] The employer cannot retain any portion of it.

There is an exception to all of this. If you provide service in a collaborative setting, such as a banquet, the tips may be pooled among those employees working that shift. But this is a limited exception, and under no circumstances can any of the money go to management or employees from other shifts.

If you are forced to pool your tips, reach out for a free consultation with an experienced employment attorney to see if your rights have been violated.

Employee rights and protections can be difficult to understand and navigate. If you believe you’ve experienced illegal activity in your workplace, you need an experienced legal team in your corner.  Halunen Law employment attorneys are deeply committed to fighting for employee rights and have an impressive record of getting results for those they represent. We represent clients on a contingency basis, so there is no cost unless we win. Contact our office today for a free, confidential consultation.

 

[1] Minn. Stat. § 177.24, subd. 3.

[2] Burt v. Rackner, 902 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 2017)

[3] Minn. R. 5200.0080

Photo of a tall stack of documents with a warmly colored background.It is unusual for any plaintiff or relator to achieve a summary judgment ruling in its favor in any type of case. But in U.S. v. Dynamic Visions Inc., DBA Dynamic Visions Home Health Services, et al., — F.3d —, 2020 WL 4914069 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2020), the D.C. Circuit affirmed such a ruling in a False Claims Act (FCA) case, alleging that a home health care company submitted false claims for reimbursement to the D.C. Medicaid program. The Circuit’s opinion shows how a relator can succeed on summary judgment and provides other useful discussions on evidence, civil contempt, piercing the corporate veil, and the proper calculation of damages in a Medicaid FCA case.

The defendant, Dynamic Visions, utterly failed a routine government audit of its operations. A review of 25 randomly selected patient files revealed a lack of the required “Plan of Care” (POC) for patients. The files either contained no POC or had deficient POCs (e.g. lacked a physician signature, contained untimely or forged signatures, or authorized fewer hours of care than claimed in bills to Medicaid). Id. at *1. The federal government executed a search warrant at the business and the residence of the owner and company president, Isaiah Bongam. The ensuing investigation revealed Bongam’s funneling of money from the company into private accounts (including offshore in Cameroon). Id. at *2.

The government brought an action against Dynamic Visions and Bongam alleging FCA violations, and its complaint listed false billings for 25 patients that were not authorized by a valid POC. The defendants failed to cooperate in discovery, particularly in providing evidence that the patients had valid POCs, and claimed that the government had seized their documents, even though they had been given a disc containing searchable PDFs of all relevant documents. Id. at *2.

Because defendants produced no documents showing valid POCs for these patients, the government moved for summary judgment. When the defendants failed to challenge the government’s statement of facts, the court granted the motion. The defendants appealed. Id.

The D.C. Circuit affirmed, except it vacated a small subset of claims involving POCs that the government claimed were forged, and for which it found questions of fact remained. Id. at *3. Most useful in the opinion is the panel’s discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence showing—“beyond genuine dispute”—the knowing submission of false claims.

The government provided evidence showing how each file lacked the proper authorization. In response, the defendants offered only conclusory allegations that the files were adequately documented and generally referenced how they followed policies and procedures. The Circuit found that the defendants provided nothing on which a jury could decide in their favor; they did not even provide the claimed policy and procedure manual they referenced in their conclusory defenses. Focusing on the available “reckless disregard” standard for falsity, the opinion affirms the district court’s conclusion that  “‘even a cursory review’ of the files would have revealed the ‘rampant’ false claims,” thereby justifying summary judgment at least on reckless disregard grounds. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(iii). Id. at *4-5. Rejecting the defendants’ arguments that scienter could not be pieced together, the Court stated there was no need to aggregate individual knowledge because “any single person who looked at the patient files should have known that the company sought reimbursements unsupported by adequate POCs.” Id. at *5.

Practitioners may also find these additional discussions useful:

Civil Contempt: Citing a two-year history of discovery non-compliance, the Court affirmed the imposition of a contempt finding against defendants, precluding them from presenting evidence in their summary judgment opposition that they did not already produce in discovery. Id. at *6.

Piercing Corporate Veil: Besides evidence of a “unity of interest between the individual and the entity,” the opinion affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Bongam’s transfer of large sums of money to his personal accounts was compelling justification to pierce the corporate veil. This was particularly so because insulating the owner from liability here would be unjust. Id.

Damages and the Federal Share of Medicaid: The Circuit sent back the damages calculations because the district court had awarded damages based on the full amount of the unauthorized reimbursements, rather than the 70% share paid by the federal government. Id. at *7.

The defendant here may have had “dynamic visions” for its home health agency, but its failure to follow even basic protocols regrettably led it into the dark tunnel of FCA liability. The take-away for practitioners is the viability of relying on reckless disregard as a basis for seeking summary judgment on a proactive basis and the type of evidence that can result in success.

SusanC-headshot-300×300A Partner at Halunen Law, Susan Coler represents whistleblowers across the United States in many different industries who challenge illegal corporate conduct, including fraud against the government. As a Labor and Employment Law Specialist, Susan has also brought successful retaliation claims in connection with False Claims Act (FCA) /qui tam cases and as stand-alone actions. Learn more.

Employment Needs
In a 7-2 decision announced on July 8, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided to exempt two religious elementary schools from lawsuits by former teachers claiming the schools had fired them for alleged discriminatory reasons. In doing so, the Supreme Court relied on the “ministerial exception,” which holds that the schools’ First Amendment right to freedom of religion essentially absolves the institution from following any national and state anti-discrimination laws in employment. The result of the Court’s ruling is that any employee of a religious organization, “so long as the employer determines that an employee’s ‘duties’ are ‘vital’ to carrying out the mission of the church,” are, shockingly, no longer protected.

The case decided concerned two elementary school teachers at Roman Catholic schools. Kristen Biel and Agnes Morrissey-Berru both taught secular subjects to fifth graders and had no prior religious training or certifications. In fact, the only part of their job that intersected with the religious mission of the schools was leading their classes in a daily prayer. Nonsensically, the Court determined that this minimal religious duty was enough to render the teachers “ministerial employees,”—and avoid liability.

The basis of the ministerial exception is that the First Amendment allows religious organizations to be free of state regulation when it comes to decisions about how to run their church, including hiring and firing their ministers. The Court’s decision this month, however, expands that idea beyond an institution’s legitimate need to organize its religious staff to carry out their mission. This new precedent will allow religious organizations to classify employees with only the slightest connection to the religious aspects of the organization as ministers to avoid complying with anti-discrimination laws. The scope of this decision is not yet clear, but it certainly puts janitors, receptionists, coaches, camp counselors, and other employees who have virtually no ministerial duties at risk of losing all their workplace rights—rights which all other Americans at secular public and private employers alike—currently enjoy. That, my friends, is contrary to the “The Golden Rule,” which many religious traditions preach.

We, at Halunen Law, respect the right of all Americans to freely practice their religion, but firmly believe in accountability for organizations who discriminate against their hardworking, taxpaying employees.

A mother checks her daughter's temperature as they sit in a clean, well-lit kitchen.With the 2020 elections fast-approaching, focus has again shifted to issues surrounding the availability of health care and medical leave. Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly given the current political climate, we’re hearing a lot of talk, but not seeing a lot of action, which is particularly tragic given the fact that less than 15% of workers nationwide currently have access to paid family or medical leave.

The lack of paid leave can have devastating consequences on employees who are forced to miss work in order to take care of their sick children, elderly parents, etc. Indeed, such employees often find their paychecks being docked for missed time, or, in the case of long-term illness or family care obligations, may even be terminated. While there are some laws that require certain employers to provide periods of unpaid leave (for example, the federal Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)), those laws do not provide any relief from the economic hardships that almost invariably accompany an unexpected medical leave.

The Minnesota Legislature is currently considering a bill (HF 5-Halverson) that would alleviate some of those financial hardships. Specifically, the MN House DFL has proposed legislation known as the Paid Family Medical Leave Act (PFMLA), which would provide Minnesota workers with up to 12 weeks of paid leave to care for a family member with a serious health condition, or to bond with a newborn child.

Generally speaking, workers would be eligible for partial wage replacement ranging from 55-90% of their regular wages, with benefits capped at $1,000 per week. Costs for the program would be split between employers and their employees, with each paying approximately $100 per year for each worker. Importantly, employers who already provided paid family leave would be able to opt out of the program and would not be required to pay such program costs.

This is not the first time the Minnesota legislature has considered the PFMLA. In 2019, Minnesota House Democrats included the substance of the Act in their initial jobs bill, but the Republican-controlled Senate opposed it, forcing it to be dropped from final negotiations.

We at Halunen Law support this legislation and the critical benefits and protections it would provide to Minnesota workers. We hope you feel the same, and if you do, we would urge you to contact your state representatives and let them know.

HELPFUL LINKS

For a summary of the PFMLA, click here:

https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/dflpdf/e80dacba-5b81-4b8e-8861-828d90b2e6ad.pdf

For the text of HF 5 and more detailed information, click here:

https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/bills/Info/HF5/91/2019/0

To find your congressional district, click here:

https://www.gis.leg.mn/pdf/leg2012/2012combo.pdf

To find out who represents your district in the Minnesota House of Representatives, click here: https://www.gis.leg.mn/php/house.php

To find out who represents your district in the Minnesota Senate, click here: https://www.gis.leg.mn/php/senate.php

Nationwide retailer Dillard’s recently settled an employment discrimination lawsuit brought by workers who say the department store forced them to provide detailed medical information in order to use their sick days. The class-action suit lasted for four years and was lead largely by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The EEOC says that the company forced employees to provide documentation about their specific medical conditions, going beyond a simple requirement that they have a doctor’s note confirming that they were being treated at all.

Read More…

Two rainbow flags catch the breeze in front of the columns of the capitol building. On June 15, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Title VII’s prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex also prohibit an employer from discriminating against an employee because of their sexual orientation or transgender status.

Prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling, only 21 states and the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico had statutes that protected both sexual orientation and gender identity in the employment sector – meaning approximately 52% of the country’s LGBT population did not have any protections in the workplace, and could be legally terminated without recourse for no other reason than their membership in the LGBT community. The Court’s 6-3 opinion now imposes liability on employers who discriminate against LGBT individuals across the country.

The historic ruling comes from three consolidated cases, which were argued in front of the Supreme Court in 2019. Each of the cases involved an employer firing a long-term employee after the employee revealed their sexual orientation or transgender status to the employer. The question posed to the Court was whether an employer who fires someone simply for being gay or transgender has discriminated against that individual because of the individual’s sex.

In ruling for protections for LGBT workers, the Court analyzed the plain language of Title VII, which prohibits discrimination because of an individual’s sex. It stated unequivocally that “an employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids.”

In its opinion, the Court provided various hypotheticals to shed light on how sex is necessarily (and intentionally) considered when terminating an individual because of their sexual orientation or transgender identity:

  • Consider, for example, an employer with two employees, both of whom are attracted to men. The two individuals are, to the employer’s mind, materially identical in all respects, except that one is a man and the other a woman. If the employer fires the male employee for no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer discriminates against him for traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague. Put differently, the employer intentionally singles out an employee to fire based in part on the employee’s sex, and the affected employee’s sex is a but-for cause of his discharge.
  • Or take an employer who fires a transgender person who was identified as a male at birth but who now identifies as a female. If the employer retains an otherwise identical employee who was identified as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth. Again, the individual employee’s sex plays an unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge decision.
  • Imagine an employer who has a policy of firing any employee known to be homosexual. The employer hosts an office holiday party and invites employees to bring their spouses. A model employee arrives and introduces a manager to Susan, the employee’s wife. Will that employee be fired? If the policy works as the em­ployer intends, the answer depends entirely on whether the model employee is a man or a woman. To be sure, that employer’s ultimate goal might be to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. But to achieve that purpose the employer must, along the way, intentionally treat an employee worse based in part on that individual’s sex.

Each of these examples illustrate that it is not possible for an employer to terminate an employee on the basis of their sexual orientation or transgender status without taking the employee’s sex into consideration. Title VII is a broad statute and does not require sex to be the only reason, or even the primary reason for the termination decision, only that the termination would not have happened but for the employee’s sex. In other words, an employer who terminates an individual because of their sexual orientation or transgender status inherently discriminates against an employee because of their sex, and therefore violates the statute.

Although Minnesota law already provides for protections for LGBT individuals under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling now makes it abundantly clear that federal law prohibits an employer from discriminating against because of their sexual orientation or transgender status – a massive victory for equality.

If you believe you are the victim of discrimination because your sexual orientation or gender identity, we encourage you to contact Halunen Law for advice.

Woman Telecommuting - Working From Home Taking Care of Baby

The landscape for workplaces is changing. As technology evolves, so too does the way we do our jobs.

Many people can (and do) work just as effectively at home as they do at work. And a recent court case said just that. It held that a telecommuting arrangement could be a reasonable accommodation for a person suffering from a disability. Click to read the case: E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co., 12-2484, 2014 WL 1584674 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2014).

If you have a disability, you have a right to reasonable accommodation from your employer. In the case above, the plaintiff had a very bad case of Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS), and asked to work from home.

She argued that this would alleviate her IBS symptoms and that most of her work could be done via computer or telephone. Ford denied the request, stating that presence in the office was essential to her job. Ford instead offered other accommodations, such as putting her office closer to the bathroom, because it argued that she needed to interact with other team members and could only access information during “core” business hours.

Read More…

In an important decision on June 3, 2020, in the case Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc.[1] the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota courts are not bound by restrictive federal court guidance in determining what constitutes sexual harassment under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”).

For the past several decades, federal courts have applied an extremely narrow, and very high, bar to what constitutes sexual harassment under federal employment laws. Because of this restrictive interpretation of the law, very few victims of sexual harassment got their cases heard by a jury, because federal judges often dismissed their cases before trial. But in Kenneh, the Minnesota Supreme Court took a big step towards allowing victims of sexual harassment to get their day in court.

History of Sexual Harassment Law

In 1964, the U.S. Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which, among other things, outlawed discrimination on the basis of sex in the workplace. Similarly, in 1973, the Minnesota Human Rights Act was amended to prohibit discrimination based on sex in Minnesota workplaces. Under these laws, part of what an employee must show when bringing a case of sex discrimination is that an employer took an ‘adverse employment action’ against them because of their sex; meaning, the employer caused them to suffer some form of harm because of the employer’s actions. Courts agree that being fired is a clear-cut example of an “adverse employment action.” But what about other actions taken by an employer that don’t rise to the level of a termination? Courts have wrestled with this question for decades.

It wasn’t until the 1980s that courts began to recognize that sexual harassment in the workplace could rise to the level of an “adverse employment action,” and thus violate the law, even if the employee was not terminated as a result of the harassment. In 1980, Minnesota recognized that sexual harassment could be considered an adverse employment action—six years before federal courts did.[2] In subsequent rulings, the U.S. Supreme Court held that sexual harassment could constitute an adverse employment action, and thus be illegal, only if it was “severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment.”[3] This standard is measured by what a “reasonable person” would consider to be hostile or abusive. Courts recognize that making this determination is not a mathematically precise test. Courts are supposed to consider all the facts and circumstances of the conduct, including the frequency of the conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Up until the Kenneh decision, Minnesota courts generally followed federal courts’ interpretation of Title VII when determining whether conduct was sexually harassing under the MHRA.

Federal Courts Keep Victims of Egregious Sexual Harassment from Having Their Day in Court

Unfortunately, federal courts continued to raise the bar higher and higher for what was considered “severe or pervasive” conduct, particularly courts within the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which encompasses Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit has held that in order to show that sexually harassing conduct is severe or pervasive, an employee must show that “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” and that the conduct was “extreme in nature and not merely rude or unpleasant.”[4]

As a result, many truly egregious cases were dismissed before reaching a jury. Here are a few examples:

  • There was no ‘severe or pervasive’ harassment where the employee’s supervisor allegedly grabbed and squeezed her nipple while saying “this is a form of sexual harassment,” and took her towel, rubbed it on his crotch, and gave it back to her.[5]
  • There was no severe or pervasive sexual harassment where the supervisor allegedly put his arms around the employee’s shoulders, kissed the side of her face, called her into his office, locked the door, prevented her from escaping, removed her hand from the doorknob, and attempted to kiss her.[6]
  • A plaintiff could not show severe or pervasive sexual harassment where the supervisor allegedly sexually propositioned her, repeatedly touched her hand, requested that she draw an image of a phallic object, displayed a poster portraying the employee as the president and CEO of the “Man Haters’ Club of America,” and asked her to type a copy of the “He-Man Women Hater’s Club” manifesto.[7]
  • Sexual harassment was not severe or pervasive where the harasser allegedly asked the employee to watch pornographic movies with him, masturbate together, told her she would advance more quickly in the company if she caused him to orgasm, kissed her on the mouth, grabbed her buttocks, brushed her groin, reached for her genitals, and gripped her thigh.[8]

Kenneh Says Minnesota Courts Not Bound by Federal Cases

But in the Kenneh case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota courts are not bound by these restrictive federal cases. In her case, Ms. Kenneh has alleged that on numerous occasions over a five month period, her supervisor told her he liked beautiful women with beautiful legs, licked his lips in a suggestive manner, physically blocked her from leaving her office with his body, told her he liked to “eat women” and that he wanted to “eat [her],” simulated oral sex with his hand and tongue, called her sexy, pretty and beautiful, and stared at her for uncomfortably long periods of time. The district court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed her case, holding that under the “severe or pervasive” standard, this was not enough evidence for Ms. Kenneh’s case to go to a jury. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed their decision, saying that it was up to a jury to decide whether the harassment was severe or pervasive.

In Kenneh, the Court held that the MHRA provides broader employment protections than federal law, and must be interpreted as such. The Minnesota Supreme Court also noted that attitudes and social norms about what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable workplace behavior are changing. It told the lower courts that they must take this into account when deciding whether conduct is severe or pervasive, rather than relying on old, restrictive federal cases. Most importantly, the justices cautioned Minnesota courts from deciding whether conduct is severe or pervasive enough, and said instead that a jury should make those determinations in most cases. This means that more victims of sexual harassment in Minnesota will now get their day in court to present their case to a jury of their peers. This is a huge step forward for victims of sexual harassment in Minnesota workplaces.

If you believe you have been the victim of sexual harassment in the workplace, we encourage you to reach out to our firm to speak with an experienced employment attorney for advice.

[1]http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Appellate/Supreme%20Court/Standard%20Opinions/OPA180174-060320.pdf

[2] Compare Cont’l Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980), with Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).

[3] Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).

[4] Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Coop., 446 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2006).

[5] Rickard v. Swedish Match North America, Inc, 773 F.3d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 2014).

[6] McMiller v. Metro, 738 F.3d 185, 186–87 (8th Cir. 2013).

[7] Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, at 931–35 (8th Cir. 2002).

[8]LeGrand v. Area Resources for Community and Human Services, 394 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2005).

Back in grade school, taking a sick day meant coming in the next day with a note for the teacher explaining the absence. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission says the national department store chain Dillards took that old-school practice too far when it required detailed information about employees’ medical conditions in return for sick leave. Dillards is settling with the EEOC for $2 million, bringing to an end a four-year class action suit alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. As is usual in these cases, Dillards denied wrongdoing and says it settled to get the whole thing over with.

Read More…

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